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	 	 AbstrACt
This paper critically analyses the challenges and priori-
ties for Rwanda’s rural sector policies in the fight against poverty. The 
lessons drawn are important, as this sector will be at the forefront of 
Rwanda’s new Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy 
(EDPRS or PRSP-2). The paper first looks at the dangers of the purely 
growth-led development focus in Rwanda’s PRSP-1 (implemented be-
tween 2002-2005), and evaluates the extent to which the agricultural 
sector has, indeed, been a pro-poor growth engine. It then studies the 
government’s current agricultural policies and looks at the recently 
adopted land law, both of which aim to modernize and ‘professional-
ize’ the rural sector. There is a high risk that policy measures in favour 
of a more professional and modern farm sector will be at the expense 
of the large mass of small-scale peasants. This paper stresses that the 
real challenge to transform the rural sector into a true pro-poor growth 
engine will be to value and incorporate the capacity and potential of 
small-scale ‘non-professional’ peasants into the core strategies for 
rural development. Rwandan policy makers and international donors 
should shift their focus away from a purely output-led logic towards 
distribution-oriented rural development policies. Striving for pro-poor 
growth requires reconciling output growth with equity, and perhaps 
even putting equity first. IOB Discussion Paper 2007-02 •  Striving for Growth, Bypassing the Poor?
	 	 résumé
Cet article analyse d’un oeil critique les priorités et les dé-
fis des politiques agricoles au Rwanda dans la lutte contre la pauvreté. 
Les conclusions sont importantes étant donnée que ce secteur sera une 
des  priorités  du  nouveau  Document  Stratégique  de  Développement 
Economique et de Réduction de la Pauvreté au Rwanda (DSRP-2). L’article 
considère d’abord le danger d’un développement qui se concentre large-
ment sur la croissance économique comme ce fut le cas dans le premier 
DSRP rwandais (implémenté entre 2002-2005) et il évalue à quel degré 
le secteur agricole a réellement constitué un moteur de croissance pro 
pauvre. Ensuite, il étudie la politique gouvernementale agricole actuelle 
et examine la récente loi foncière, qui visent à moderniser et à profession-
naliser le secteur agricole. Il y a un grand risque que les mesures actuelles, 
favorisant une agriculture plus professionnelle et plus moderne, agissent 
au détriment d’un grand nombre d’agriculteurs de petite taille. Cet article 
veut illustrer que le vrai défi pour transformer le secteur rural au Rwan-
da en moteur de croissance en faveur des pauvres serait de reconnaître 
la capacité et le potentiel des agriculteurs non professionnels de petite 
taille dans les politiques de développement rural. Les autorités rwanda-
ises et les bailleurs internationaux devraient évoluer en passant d’une 
logique de croissance et de production maximales vers des mesures de 
développement de redistribution. Aspirer à la création d’une croissance 
pro pauvre nécessite de réconcilier la croissance avec l’équité en donnant 
peut-être même la priorité à l’équité.IOB Discussion Paper 2007-02 • 7 Striving for Growth, Bypassing the Poor?
	 	 IntroduCtIon
At the dawn of the new millennium, the commitment of 
the international community to the millennium development goals has 
placed the fight against poverty as the top priority on the respective 
agendas of international donor and recipient countries. Concurrently, 
international financial institutions (IFIs) have launched the “Poverty 
Reduction Strategy” program (PRSP). This new, country-led, poverty-
alleviating framework replaced the previous system of Structural Ad-
justment Programs (SAPs). With over fifty countries having reached the 
PRSP implementation phase, this strategy has become the standard 
framework for development strategies. It also functions as an access 
gate to international financial aid (e.g. Poverty Reduction and Growth 
Facilities, and debt alleviation under the HIPC1 initiative). 
Rwanda entered the PRSP process in 2000. The govern-
ment first elaborated an interim PRSP that was later transformed into 
the final PRSP-1 document. The strategy was endorsed by the IFIs 
in 2002, and implemented from 2002 until 2005. IMF joint staff as-
sessments largely appraised the Rwandan policy document as well 
as PRSP progress reports describing the program’s implementation 
process (IMF, 2004A, 2005A, 2006A). In early 2006, the Rwandan 
government began to elaborate a second PRSP policy. This strategy, 
the “Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy” (in this 
paper referred to as EDPRS or PRSP-2), is to be finalized in 2007. It will 
be implemented over the following five years, financed by bilateral and 
international donors to a large extent.
The agricultural sector is considered crucial in all of Rwan-
da’s strategic documents on poverty reduction. One of the “six pillars” 
in the Vision 2020 document was defined as the “transformation of 
agriculture into a productive, high-value, market-oriented sector with 
forward linkages to other sectors” (GoR, 2000). PRSP-1 also identi-
fied rural development and agricultural transformation as one of the 
six pillars for poverty reduction (i.e. “actions that most directly affect 
poor peoples’ ability to raise their incomes”- GoR, 2002:35). Further, 
each PRSP progress report has devoted a special section to progress 
in this sector.
This is hardly surprising given that agriculture employs 
almost 90% of Rwanda’s active working population and represents 
about 45% of its GDP. Moreover, it is in the rural environment, rather 
than in urban areas, that poverty is more prominent and severe. Based 
on a national poverty line of 250 Frw (US$ 0.44 nominal 2006 prices) 
per adult per day, 61.7% of the rural population is considered poor 
(2006 figures). The incidence of urban poverty is considerably lower 
.1  HIPC  stands  for  heavily-indebted  poor  coun-
tries. • IOB Discussion Paper 2007-02 Striving for Growth, Bypassing the Poor?
(e.g. 10.4% in Kigali city and 17.8% in other towns) (UNDP, 2007). In 
absolute numbers, about 4.93 million of the 5.38 million poor live in 
rural areas (GoR, 2007A). 
With the end of Rwanda’s first PRSP implementation pe-
riod, the country’s experience allows us to reach certain preliminary 
conclusions with regards to the results and usefulness of the PRSP 
strategy. The identified strengths and weaknesses may help to en-
hance the efficiency of the new EDPRS policy. In the first part of this 
paper, we focus on the dangers of a growth-led strategy for poverty 
reduction, and then look at the role of rural development as a growth 
engine in PRSP policy2. In the second part, we analyse the current 
agricultural and land policies that support rural development. These 
policies should serve as a blueprint for the EDPRS program in which 
the rural sector will be at the fore. A third part looks at how rural poli-
cies will affect the welfare and bargaining positions of different types 
of farmers. In the concluding part of the paper, we question whether 
there is, indeed, an unavoidable trade-off between output growth and 
equity considerations.
2  For  a  broader  evaluation  of  Rwanda’s  PRSP 
strategy, see Evans et al. (2006).IOB Discussion Paper 2007-02 •  Striving for Growth, Bypassing the Poor?
	 1.	 the	fIght	AgAInst	poverty:
	 	 settIng	the	rIght	prIorItIes?
   1.1.  Depending on the trickle-down effect? The danger of
     a growth-led strategy for poverty reduction 
After  four  years  implementing  poverty-combating  poli-
cies, we can now conclude on whether the assumptions made in Rwan-
da’s PRSP-1 were realistic. Targets for annual growth per capita in the 
first Rwandan PRSP were set at 4-5% for the next 15 to 20 years. This 
implies 7-8% per annum overall real growth (GoR, 2000). Projections 
were, however, later reduced to 6-7% for the PRSP-1’s 2002-2005 
implementation period (GoR, 2002). In subsequent PRSP progress 
reports and IMF statistical documents, growth projections were typi-
cally set at around 6%. Two important questions then arise. First, have 
these growth expectations been realistic; and second, to what extent 
did growth translate into poverty reduction? 
These ambitious projections for the first PRSP implemen-
tation period seemed to be justified based on Rwanda’s solid post-civil 
war economic recovery with average annual growth of 8.6% between 
1996 and 2001. There are, however, some critical observations to add. 
Graph 1 shows how the average period growth rate is influenced by ex-
ceptional growth figures in the first years (i.e. the steep slope), which 
moderate a few years later. From a longer-term perspective, economic 
performance has still not reached mid-1980s levels. Moreover, Rwan-
da benefited from the receipt of substantial aid funds, which signifi-
cantly exceeded the sub-Saharan African average (Ansoms, 2005). The 
country also benefited from financial transfers out of the DRC during 
the years of Rwanda’s military involvement there (Cassimon and Ma-
rysse, 2001). It seems likely that these capital inflows fuelled Rwan-
da’s exceptional economic recovery in the immediate post-war period.
Graph 1: Evolution of GDP per capita
Source: World Bank, 2006.10 • IOB Discussion Paper 2007-02 Striving for Growth, Bypassing the Poor?
In more recent years (i.e. 2003-2006), annual growth 
did not meet the projected rate of approximately 6% (IMF: 2005B, 
2006B). This recent trend illustrates the vulnerability of Rwanda’s 
economy to structural limitations, including overpopulation, resource 
scarcity and a limited potential for economic diversification. Further, 
overall growth targets for the coming years were lowered to between 
4% and 4.5%. This would dampen per capita growth to a modest 2.1 
– 2.6%3, far below the rate of 4 to 5% presented as a target in PRSP1. 
With reference to the above, the first issue to consider 
is whether growth will be substantial and sustainable enough in the 
near future; or whether current economic trends will signal the onset 
of more temperate times. 
The  second  principal  issue  is  the  degree  of  economic 
growth’s ‘pro-poorness’. There are two dominant views on what con-
stitutes pro-poor growth (Page, 2006). One definition highlights the 
importance  of  reducing  inequality  by  defining  pro-poor  growth  as 
growth that disproportionably benefits the poor (Kraay, 2006; Klasen, 
2003; Kakwani and Pernia, 2000). Another definition regards econom-
ic growth as pro-poor when the living conditions of the poor improve 
in absolute terms, thus when poverty decreases (Ravallion and Chen, 
2003). The main issue then is how much growth is pro-poor. This can 
be measured in several ways, for example with the country’s growth 
elasticity of poverty index. 
Cross-country evidence situates the average growth elas-
ticity of poverty within the interval -2 and –3. This implies that positive 
(or negative) growth of 1% should lead to a 2-3% decrease (or increase) 
in the incidence of poverty, as measured by the percentage of people 
living below poverty line of US$ 1 PPP per head (Ravallion and Chen, 
1997; World Bank, 2000; Ravallion, 2001 and Adams, 2004). Adams 
(2004) found that this elasticity might differ for individual countries 
depending upon their initial inequality levels. Countries with higher in-
equality levels (i.e. Gini > 0.4) have lower poverty elasticity rates and 
vice versa. 
Turning to Rwanda, the growth elasticity of poverty for 
the recent post-conflict period is not very promising in comparison 
with other developing countries . In the immediate post-genocide pe-
riod (1994-2000), each percentage point of economic growth led only 
to a 0.37% decrease in the incidence of poverty, this is an elasticity of 
–0.37 (Ansoms, 2005). Rwanda’s case thus seems to be a clear exam-
ple of the highly negative impact of inequality upon the pro-poor ef-
fect of growth (GoR, 2002). 2001’s high inequality rate (Gini of 0.451) 
contrasts dramatically with those of the mid-1980s when Rwanda 
3  T his is the per capita growth rate based on the 
overall GDP growth rate and a continued annual 
population increase of approximately 1.9 %, this 
is  the  2001-2005  average  according  to  World 
Bank (2006). Other sources estimate population 
growth to be much higher, which would result in 
an even lower per capita growth rate.IOB Discussion Paper 2007-02 • 11 Striving for Growth, Bypassing the Poor?
qualified as a low-inequality country (with a Gini of 0.289 - Ansoms, 
2005)4.
Moreover, inequality has further increased over the PRSP–
1 implementation period, with the Gini reaching 0.51 in 2006. For the 
same period, the incidence of poverty decreased from 60.3% to 56.9% 
based on the national poverty line (which is different from the US$ 1 
PPP per day poverty line5 - GoR, 2006A). In combination with an aver-
age annual growth of 4.6%, this results in a growth elasticity of pov-
erty of -0.40. Although this figure is not comparable with the cross-
country average (due to the difference in poverty lines), the result is 
clearly disappointing. The pro-poor character of Rwandan economic 
growth is thus extremely weak, and this despite the implementation 
of PRSP policy. 
Overall, the disappointing derived effect of post-conflict 
growth  on  poverty  incidence,  in  combination  with  more  moderate 
growth projections for the coming years, certainly tempers the po-
tential of a successful growth-reliant strategy for poverty reduction 
in Rwanda. 
   1.2.  The agricultural sector as a growth engine in
     PRSP policy
Even more challenging is the PRSP’s ambition to trans-
form the rural sector into an engine for growth. Over decades, devel-
opment theory has been influenced by the presumption of the need 
for the structural transformation of an economy to achieve modern 
economic growth. As stated by Kuznets6, “(these) major aspects of 
structural change include the shift away from agriculture to non-ag-
ricultural pursuits … with a corresponding change in the occupation 
status of labour” (i.e. “changes in the distribution of the labor force 
between agriculture and the non-agricultural production sectors” - 
Kuznets,  1973:248).  Based  on  Western  experience,  less-developed 
countries were pushed to strive for economic emancipation through 
the modernization of their own economies with a decreased reliance 
on the primary sector (i.e. agricultural activities). 
However, the African experience has been characterized 
by decades of unfruitful attempts to shift away from the agricultural 
sector7. More recently, with the “fight against poverty” at the forefront 
of the international agenda and due to high rural poverty rates, the 
need for rural-led development and economic growth has resurfaced 
in popular development theory (see Mwabu and Thorbecke, 2004). 
As a result, appreciation of the agriculture sector’s importance has 
4  There  are  no  nationally  representative,  com-
parable data available to measure the Gini coef-
ficient between 1985 and 2001. 
5  The incidence of poverty, using the poverty line 
of 1$ PPP per head per day, is not yet available for 
2006. The national poverty line is equivalent to 
250 frw (US$ 0.44 nominal 2006 prices) per adult 
equivalent per day.
6  Simon Kuznets (1901-1985) was a renowned 
economist  whose  study  on  the  evolution  of  in-
equality over time resulted in the defining of the 
“Kuznets  curve”.  Kuznets’  theory  state  that  in-
equality increases over time up to a point where 
a critical income level is reached. From then on-
wards  inequality  decreases  with  rising  income 
levels.  The  Kuznets  curve  has  the  shape  of  an 
inverted U with economic development on the X 
axis and inequality on the Y axis.
7  In  the  early  1970s,  agriculture  represented 
around 20.9% of GDP in sub-Saharan Africa; by 
2002 this has decreased slightly but the relative 
importance of primary activities still amounts to 
17.7%.  Moreover,  the  primary  sector  counts  for 
40% or more of total GDP in over ten sub-Saha-
ran African countries, and it is the most important 
sector in terms of employment in many more sub-
Saharan African countries (World Bank, 2006).12 • IOB Discussion Paper 2007-02 Striving for Growth, Bypassing the Poor?
returned, though the continued need for households to diversify their 
incomes by shifting away from pure subsistence agriculture towards 
other activities, both in the farm and non-farm economy, is still rec-
ognized (see, for example, Yaro, 2006; Abdulai and CroleRees, 20018).  
Indeed also Rwanda’s PRSP highlights the crucial impor-
tance of the rural sector for the country’s economic future. The agri-
culture and livestock sector are presented as “the primary engine of 
growth”, though the document also stresses the importance of finding 
other new growth engines (GoR, 2002:30). PRSP-1 projections for ag-
ricultural performance were ambitious as “primary growth is predicted 
to start at 5.2% and accelerate over the period” (GoR, 2002:75). This 
estimate corresponded with projections made by Mellor who foresaw 
75% of this growth will be due to improved fertiliser use, 16% to more 
intensive farming, and 9% to the swamp reclamation program (Mellor, 
2002A).
However, between 2002 and 2004 agricultural activity 
stagnated and even contracted (Table 1). These statistics probably un-
derestimate the sector’s poor performance, given that estimates pro-
vided by the Minagri / Food Security Research Project (FSRP - available 
only for 2000 – 2002) are significantly lower. The FSRP’s statistics 
seem to be more appropriate for measuring food production than na-
tional account data9 (IMF, 2004B). The most straightforward expla-
nation for contractions in agricultural activities is the impact of poor 
weather on food production. As mentioned in the PRSP progress report, 
growth in agricultural output is largely “at the mercy of good weather” 
(GoR, 2004A: 17). Agricultural growth between 2004 –2005 again 
met the PRSP target; however Rwanda was once again affected by bad 
weather in 2006 and early 2007.











Agriculture 44.5 15.0 -4.5 1.4 5.8
			of	which	food	crop 37.7 17.3 -4.9 -0.7 7.3
			of	which	export	crop 1.2 4.2 -26.1 48.8 -20.6
			of	which	livestock 4.0 3.0 3.0 10.3 3.0
			of	which	fisheries 0.3 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0
			of	which	forestry 1.3 3.1 3.0 -0.6 3.0
Total	GDP 100.0 9.6 0.7 4.4 6.3
Source: GoR, 2005A:113. For a recent update, see Ruzindaza, 2006. 
These figures clearly illustrate the failure of the first PRSP 
8  Studying northern Ghana, Yaro opposes the de-
agrarianisation thesis by arguing that livelihood 
adaptation can take the form of both a shift from 
farm to non-farm activities, as well as an intensi-
fication of purely agricultural activities. Abdulai 
and  CroleRees  also  study  diversification  strate-
gies, both in and outside the agrarian sector (e.g. 
livestock raising and non-farm jobs next to crop 
raising).  They  conclude  that,  in  the  context  of 
southern Mali, it is mostly the lack of capital, the 
remoteness index and the lack of education that 
limit a household’s options for diversifying their 
income portfolio.
 
9  Using Minagri / FSRP (Food Security Research 
Project) data to compute national accounts would 
have  a  large  influence  on  overall  figures.  GDP 
would, for example, be 13% lower than what is 
reported by the national account data in the IMF 
reports for 2000. The agricultural sector would 
then represent only 35% instead of 44% of total 
GDP. The IMF report, analyzing discrepancies be-
tween both data sources, considers the FSRP data 
to be more reliable and even suggests that “these 
differences  [between  original  national  account 
data and FSRP data] are substantial enough to in-
fluence the assessment of food security in Rwan-
da” (IMF, 2004:12).IOB Discussion Paper 2007-02 • 1 Striving for Growth, Bypassing the Poor?
strategy to transform the agricultural sector into a stable engine for 
growth. The (poor) performance might also be due, in part, to weak 
budgetary commitments to the rural economy, see table 2, where 
two dominant problems emerge. First, agriculture-related spending 
represents only 2-5% of the priority budget (actual figures) between 
2002-200510. The share of agriculture-related spending is small in 
comparison to the financial commitments directed, for example, to 
tertiary education (around 14% of the 2002-2003 priority budget). 
These figures indicate how the Rwandan government presents spend-
ing posts targeting at the urban elite as pro-poor priority expenditures. 
A second major problem lies in the low absorptive capacity of the ag-
ricultural sector, illustrated by the discrepancy between budgeted and 
actual spending in 2003 and 2004. Despite some improvements to-
wards 2006, agricultural activity and the broader rural sector in gen-
eral have not received sufficient budgetary commitments. It is not sur-
prising therefore that the rural economy did not meet PRSP forecasts. 


























as	%	of	total	exp. 25.3 32.1 35.8 28.4 30.5 35.6 35.7 32.5 35.9 42.0 49.8 54.2
Tot	Priority	expenditures	(%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
		-	Of	which	education	(%) 62.9 22.9 21.5 21.4 24.8 22.2 24.1 23.8 38.2 39.7 41.3 36.9
						Of	which	tertiary	(%)	 19.7 15.5 14.2 13.3 13.8 12.8 na na na na na na
		-	Of	which	agriculture	(%) 4.6 4.6 5.2 4.7 2.3 3.4 2.2 3.4 4.9 4.7 6.4 11.5
Remark: “Act” stands for actual expenditures,“budg” stands for budgeted expenditures
Sources: Purcell et al., 2005; GoR, 2006B and GoR, 2007B.
10 The decreasing relative importance of agricul-
tural expenditures, in comparison to 2002, is the 
result of a considerable reduction in agricultural 
spending in absolute terms; but it is also due to 
an enlargement of the definition of “priority ex-
penditures”, with the inclusion of new spending 
categories unrelated to the rural economy.1 • IOB Discussion Paper 2007-02 Striving for Growth, Bypassing the Poor?
   1.3.  How pro-poor is agricultural growth?
There  seems  to  be  increased  awareness  in  Rwanda’s 
second poverty reduction strategy (EDPRS), now being prepared, of 
agriculture’s importance as “the pillar for rural development” (GoR, 
2004B:1). During interviews in early 2006, EDPRS ministerial stake-
holders expressed their hopes that the new document would accen-
tuate the rural sector, and transform it into a real engine for growth 
through agricultural transformation11. The goal then is to realise the 
ambition  of  the  first  PRSP,  “because  Rwanda’s  growth  strategy  is 
based on agriculture, it is specifically designed to be pro-poor” (GoR, 
2002:31).  
But is it naïve to assume that growth, per se, even when 
sought in the rural economy would be pro-poor? Growth in the agricul-
tural sector does have a greater impact upon poverty reduction than 
growth in other sectors (Gallup et al., 2007 and Christiaensen et al., 
2006). Moreover, agricultural growth spills over to other activities in 
the rural economy (Thirtle et al., 2002 and Irz et al., 2001). But the 
impact of agricultural growth on poverty reduction depends upon the 
extent to which the poor participate in this growth. One World Bank 
study (2005) found that the participation of poor rural households in 
agricultural growth could differ greatly depending upon the local con-
text. They identify several policies that can improve the pro-poor char-
acter of agricultural growth, all relating to improving the institutional 
environment of smaller and poorer producers (e.g. access to markets, 
technology, risk-coping mechanisms - World Bank, 2005). Other stud-
ies emphasize the importance of a relatively equal distribution of as-
sets, particularly land, to achieve an optimal pro-poor growth effect 
(Ravallion and Datt, 2002; Deininger and Squire, 1998 and de Janvry 
and Sadoulet, 1996). A recent (2006) OECD report highlights the im-
portance of small-scale agriculture, with its potential to create a win-
win outcome for economic growth and poverty reduction.     
The potential of the economy’s sectors to reduce poverty 
through growth can be measured by comparing the growth elastic-
ity of poverty for each sector. The sector’s elasticity multiplied by the 
sectoral share of GDP gives the participation effect for each sector to 
overall poverty reduction. Christiaensen and Demery (2006) have es-
timated both effects for sub-Sahara African (SSA) low-income coun-
tries (Table 3, SSA-low income results) from the following equation:
DlnP = p0+ pa sa DYa+ pi si DYi+ ps ss DYs
where px is the elasticity of poverty of sector x12, sx is the 
share of sector x in GDP, and px * sx is the participation effect. 
11  The report of the EDPRS Process Launch Work-
shop  (2-3  February  2006,  Kigali)  mentions  ag-
ricultural and rural development to be of critical 
importance as one of the key issues raised during 
the  workshop’s  discussion  on  how  to  support 
growth and poverty reduction. As mentioned in a 
preliminary draft of the EDPRS (July 2007), one of 
its strategic priorities is to “raise agricultural pro-
ductivity and ensure food security” (GoR, 2007A).
12 The growth elasticity of poverty of the agricul-
tural sector is measured as the ratio between the 
log average annual change in poverty and the log 
average annual change in primary GDP per capita.IOB Discussion Paper 2007-02 • 1 Striving for Growth, Bypassing the Poor?






Agr Ind Ser Agr Ind Ser Agr Ind Ser
SSA,	low-income 32 23 45 -6.22 1.31 -1.09 -1.99 0.30 -0.49
Rwanda	1994-2000 45 19 36 -2.17 -1.17 -0.66 -0.98 -0.22 -0.24
Rwanda	2001-2006 41 21 38 -0.84 -0.52 -0.61 -0.35 -0.11 -0.23
Remark: “Agr” stands for the agricultural sector, “Ind” stands for the industrial sector, “Ser” stands 
for the service sector.
* GDP shares for Rwanda are based on the average between 1994 and 2000, and the average between 
2001 and 200513.
 ** The growth elasticity of poverty and the participation effect for Rwanda 2001-2006 are not 
comparable with the other figures, given that a different poverty line has been used to calculate these 
figures.
Sources: for SSA data - Christiaensen and Demery, 2006; for Rwandan data - Ansoms, 2007.
Similar calculations for Rwanda (Table 3) show that the 
growth elasticity of poverty for the agricultural sector is low. For the 
period 1994-2000, the elasticity is almost three times lower than 
that of the average SSA, low-income country. Nonetheless, Rwandan 
statistics for this period are consistent with cross-country findings, to 
the extent that agricultural growth is correlated with considerably 
more poverty reduction than growth in the other two sectors (i.e. the 
secondary and tertiary sectors). However, for the period 2001-2006, 
the situation seems to have worsened. Though these figures cannot 
be compared with other Rwandan and SSA statistics (as a different 
poverty line has been used for the calculations), we can nonetheless 
observe that the elasticity and participation effect of the Rwandan ag-
ricultural sector are very low, and are no longer significantly different 
from those of the other two sectors (Ansoms, 2007). 
Overall, the pro-poor impact of agricultural growth over 
the PRSP-1 implementation period is thus problematic. This can be 
explained by a low participation of the poorer rural categories in ag-
ricultural growth. As we show later in this paper, there are many in-
stitutional constraints that Rwandan small-scale peasants face (e.g. 
the lack of access to markets, credit and risk-insurance opportunities, 
fertilisers, etc.). Further, Rwanda is characterised by a high degree of 
land inequality (Table 4). Moreover, small-scale peasants have been 
increasingly marginalized in terms of land ownership over the past 
decades. According to Jayne et alii (2003), average land availability 
has strongly declined for all quartiles between 1990 and 2000, except 
for the richest. In line with cross-country evidence (e.g. Ravallion and 
Datt, 2002; Deininger and Squire, 1998 and de Janvry and Sadoulet, 
1996), the Rwandan example thus illustrates how highly unequal dis-
tribution of land holdings contributes to the weakening of linkage of 
land-poorer groups to agricultural growth.
13 Data on the GDP division over primary, second-
ary and tertiary sectors – necessary to calculate 
the total value added of the agricultural sector 
- were not available for 2006.16 • IOB Discussion Paper 2007-02 Striving for Growth, Bypassing the Poor?





Quart	1 Quart	2 Quart	3 Quart	4 Av. Gini	1 Gini	2 Gini	3
1984 1.20 0.07 0.15 0.26 0.62 0.28 - - -
1990 0.94 0.05 0.10 0.16 0.39 0.17 0.43 0.43 0.41
2000 0.71 0.02 0.06 0.13 0.43 0.16 0.52 0.54 0.54
Remark: Gini 1 is defined in terms of land per household, Gini 2 in terms of land per capita and Gini 3 in 
terms of land per adult.
Source: Jayne et al., 2003:262.
	 2.	 trAnsformIng	the	rurAl	seCtor:	new	polICIes		
	 	 	 for	AChIevIng	AgrICulturAl	growth
The previous analysis highlights the importance of evalu-
ating poverty combating and particularly rural sector policies on both 
their growth-enhancing and poverty-reducing character. In this sec-
tion, we therefore look at the most recent Rwandan rural policy docu-
ments. 
   2.1.  The agricultural policy
Current  Rwandan  agricultural  policy  (the  National  Ag-
ricultural Policy or NAP) was elaborated and then operationalized in 
the 2004 Strategic Plan for Agricultural Transformation (SPAT). Both 
documents serve as blueprints for the elaboration of EDPRS policy. 
The  NAP’s  global  objective  is  “to  create  conditions  fa-
vourable to sustainable development and promotion of agricultural 
and livestock produces, in order to ensure national food security, inte-
gration of agriculture and livestock in a market-oriented economy and 
to generate increasing incomes to the producers.” (GoR, 2004A: 11). 
This policy outline has been translated into action plans in the SPAT 
document, which are to be realised over a 4-year period, starting with 
a pilot phase in 2005 and then followed by a 3-year implementation 
period. It aims to transform the agricultural sector from a subsist-
ence production orientation towards a professional, commercial and 
competitive economic activity. The SPAT document (Table 5) focuses 
on 4 priority programs subdivided into seventeen sub-programs (GoR, 
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Table 5: SPAT strategy and budgetary priorities
As % of total SPAT budget 2006 2007	est.2008	est.
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0
P1:	The	intensification	and	development	of	
sustainable	production	systems 39.3 38.8 38.3
SP11: Sustainable management of nat. resources 
- conservation of water and soils 0.7 0.6 0.5
SP12: Development of integrated livestock systems, 
agro-sylvo-pastoral production  8.8 7.7 7.0
SP13: Marshland development  0.8 0.7 0.6
SP14: Irrigation development 0.2 0.2 0.2
SP15: Supply and use of fertilizers and 
mechanisation 28.8 28.6 29.1
SP16: Food security, management of risks and 
vulnerability
1.2% 1.1 1.0
P2:	Support	to	professionalization	of	producers 21.1 21.9 23.6
SP21: Promotion of farmers organizations and 
strengthening of producers capacities 3.3 2.9 2.6
SP22: Reform of proximity services to producers and 
rural innovation 0.8 0.7 0.6
SP23: Promotion of research for agriculture and 
livestock development 16.9 18.3 20.3
SP24: Rural financial systems and agriculture credit 
development 0.1 0.1 0.1
P3:	Promotion	of	commodity	chains	horticulture	
-	development	of	agribusiness 9.1 11.3 11.6
SP31: Creation of a conducive business environment 
and enterprise promotion 0.8 0.7 0.6
SP32: Promotion and development of commodity 
chains and horticulture 0.7 0.6 0.6
SP33: Transformation and competitiveness of 
agricultural products 7.6 10.0 10.4
SP34: Rural support infrastructures 0.0 0.0 0.0
P4:	Institutional	development 30.6 27.9 26.5
SP41: Management support 27.0 24.9 23.8
SP42: ICT development and coordination in the 
agricultural sector 2.6 2.1 1.9
SP43: Planning, coordination, monitoring and 
evaluation of the agricultural sector 1.0 0.9 0.8
Source: Rutagwenda, 2006 (an earlier indicative budget was published in GoR, 2004B).1 • IOB Discussion Paper 2007-02 Striving for Growth, Bypassing the Poor?
On different occasions, SPAT refers to its mission to im-
prove the living conditions of the rural poor by guaranteeing that “dif-
ferent categories of agricultural farmers, especially the most vulner-
able, benefit from the economic growth that is being advocated” (GoR, 
2004B:7). However, of the seventeen sub-programs only one (SP16 
– food security, management of risks and vulnerability) has a clear pro-
poor character. This sub-program focuses on reducing food and nutri-
tional deficits, reducing vulnerability in food deficit zones and of popu-
lation groups affected by this, and on creating massive employment 
through labour intensive works targeting vulnerable categories. 
There seems to be a clear ambition to satisfy the popula-
tion’s food needs with national production14. However, the approach 
advocated focuses on the supply side by striving for maximum output 
growth, instead of concentrating on how vulnerable groups will take 
part in creating this growth and will thus acquire the necessary pur-
chasing power to access food supplies. Little attention is given to pre-
venting those processes or events that increase the economic vulner-
ability of these peoples’ lives. 
Also  problematic  is  the  conceptualisation  of  the  term 
‘vulnerable groups’. This term appears in both SPAT and the PRSP to 
relate to female or child-headed households, genocide survivors, and 
demobilised / resettled households (GoR, 2002; GoR, 2004B). This in-
terpretation, based on gender or war-related identities, is very restric-
tive and disregards the multi-dimensionality of vulnerability in the ru-
ral context. As a result, there is no effort to identify other vulnerable 
groups (e.g. nearly landless peasants), their current challenges and 
needs, and how rural development strategy might impact or improve 
their living conditions. 
The  remainder  of  the  SPAT  document  focuses  on  agri-
cultural  modernisation,  intensification,  professionalisation  and  en-
terprise development to transform the primary sector into a growth 
engine. Growth is expected to emerge from two sources, “those which 
are linked to export potential within the commodity chains and those 
which are related to internal market development” (GoR, 2004B:vii). 
The commodity chains to be promoted include maize, rice, and tra-
ditional export crops such as tea and coffee, exactly the crops where 
SPAT foresees a major private sector role (GoR, 2004B: 20-21). SPAT  
also puts effort into developing integrated livestock systems and ex-
ploiting opportunities for agribusiness (e.g. fruit processing enterprise) 
(GoR, 2004B: 39).
The SPAT strategies seem to be tailor-made for larger 
farmers whose farm structure and risk-coping abilities allow them 
14 In 2001, commercial imports of food accounted 
for 25.5% of national food needs, food aid contrib-
uted another 6.5% of total needs (GoR, 2004B).IOB Discussion Paper 2007-02 • 1 Striving for Growth, Bypassing the Poor?
to  invest  in  new,  high-potential  production  systems.  However,  ac-
cess to these modernised and professionalised techniques seems less 
straightforward for risk-averse small peasants. The SPAT document 
reflects two somewhat different views of smallholders’ capacities to 
transform their agricultural production systems. Some parts recog-
nise the constraints that small peasants face. The document, for ex-
ample, refers to the lack of credit15, and the inability of smallholders to 
insure themselves against shocks and setbacks. However, it does not 
develop a strategic plan to assure access of these small-scale peas-
ants to the modernised production techniques that rural policy makers 
promote. Other parts of the document mention the ignorance and re-
sistance of peasants to adopting recommended productivity-enhanc-
ing measures that go beyond traditional subsistence farming (e.g. see 
GoR, 2004B:6,17). As such, their lack of capacity to embrace ‘modern-
ised’ farming is attributed to a ‘wrong mentality’ problem, a view that 
disregards the institutional barriers these peasants face.
In fact, Rwanda’s rural policy has the ambition to reduce 
the agriculture-dependent population to 50% by 2020, considerably 
less than today’s 87% (GoR, 2004A; GoR, 2004B). The plan foresees 
that a growing primary sector will then “create progressive develop-
ment of secondary and tertiary sectors in rural areas, which could help 
create employment outside agriculture” (GoR, 2004B:59). The land 
policy takes it further,  “… the Rwandan family farm unit is no longer 
viable. … The re-organization of the available space and technological 
innovations are necessary in order to ensure food security for a stead-
ily and rapidly increasing population” (GoR, 2004C:16). This process is 
described by Alison Des Forges as the government’s ambition to “win-
now out the chaff” (Des Forges, 2006).      
SPAT, in terms of budgetary commitments, also mentions 
how “allocation of government financial resources will be done with 
priority  towards  most  competitive  actions  and  productions”  (GoR, 
2004B: viii). This objective is translated into budgetary planning (Ta-
ble 5). The ‘pro-poor’ sub-program (SP16) represents only 1% of the 
total SPAT budget, clearly not the first priority in financial terms. Next 
to one-quarter of the budget allocated to management costs, the top 
priorities for the coming years are the promotion of fertilisers and 
mechanisation, and the promotion of research for agriculture and live-
stock development. The main objective of the fertiliser strategy is to 
increase chemical fertilizer use from 10 to 42 kg per hectare per annum 
over the next five years, which could, indeed, also reach small-scale 
peasants. However, a further in-depth analysis of constraints on ferti-
liser use is necessary. By putting the blame on peasants’ supposed ig-
norance regarding the profitability of fertiliser use, other institutional 
barriers are ignored (e.g. their lack of purchasing power, the limited or 
15 Less than 2% of total credits allocated in 2003 
go to the agricultural sector. Only 8% of those 
loans  concern  amounts    less  than  20.000  frw 
(US$ 25). Small farmers are unlikely to borrow 
more than this amount (GoR, 2004B).20 • IOB Discussion Paper 2007-02 Striving for Growth, Bypassing the Poor?
non-availability of access to credit and insurance mechanisms to over-
come setbacks, etc.). 
   2.2.  The land policy and land kaw
The recently-adopted land policy and law show a similar 
commitment in favour of competitive and commercial farmers. The 
land law was adopted in 200516 after a long process of drafting and 
negotiation, and seeks to formalize land rights through official titling. 
During the elaboration phase of the land law, the PRSP stated that 
“the design of the land policy to encourage security of tenure is central” 
(GoR, 2002B:36). The new land law aims to break with a past of infor-
mal land arrangements and transfers built upon customary traditions. 
Although customary land rights are recognized as a basis for acquiring 
official rights, land registration is made compulsory; and in the future, 
land arrangements are to be regulated through formal legal proce-
dures (article 26). The Rwandan government hopes that secure official 
land titles will encourage increased investment in land conservation 
and quality improvements (GoR, 2004C:24). However, in line with the 
new law, official titles can only be acquired through a formal procedure 
of registration with proof in the form of a certificate. More privileged 
groups have a clear advantage to use this as an additional tool in their 
“struggle for land”. Studies that largely praise the beneficial effects of 
official land registration recognize the problem of unequal access to 
information in the registration process, “the introduction of a modern 
registration system to replace a customary (and typically less formal) 
system may provide opportunities for ‘land grabbing’ by those who 
are better informed, are more familiar with formal processes, and have 
better access to officials and financial means to undertake procedures 
for registration” (Feder and Nishio, 1998: 38). 
The land law further aims at solving the problems of land 
fragmentation  and  unproductive  use.  Fragmentation  of  land  hold-
ings has long been a major problem in Rwanda. The previous land 
policy (dating from March 1976) aimed to counter this by only allow-
ing land transfers (with specific permission) when the seller’s property 
remained at a minimum of two hectares, and when the buyer had no 
more than two hectares17 (article 2-3 of the Décret-Loi n°09/76, March 
1976). Given that average land holdings in the 1970’s were around 1.4 
hectares per household, this policy aimed at a redistribution of land 
by restricting transfers from the land-poor to the (relatively) land-rich. 
The question is, however, to what extent this policy was followed. The 
informal land market, which emerged during the period to arrange the 
transfer of land titles, even with written documents used as validation, 
almost never followed formal policy prescriptions (Platteau, 2000). 
16 Its full name is the Organic Law determining 
the use and management of land in Rwanda (N° 
08/2005  of  14/07/2005,  GoR,  2005).  It  was 
published on 15 September 2005 in the Official 
Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda. A previous 
version of the land law and policy was also sum-
marised in Rwanda’s Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Paper (GoR, 2002). 
17 The  law  (Décret-Loi  n°09/76,  March  1976) 
states, « nul ne peut céder ses droits par la vente, 
si ce n’est par une autorisation préalable et écrite 
du Ministre … » (article 2), and, « le Ministre ayant 
les terres dans ses attributions ne peut accorder 
l’autorisation prévue … que pour autant que: (1) 
le vendeur justifie garder à sa disposition une su-
perficie minimum de deux hectares; (2) l’acheteur 
présente  un  motif  valable  d’acquisition,  notam-
ment n’être pas en possession d’un terrain d’une 
superficie de plus de deux hectares … »  (article 
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The new land policy tackles the problem of land fragmen-
tation in a very different way. Article 20 prohibits dividing land parcels 
of one hectare or less. For the division of plots between one and five 
hectares, the owner has to apply to the land commission for authori-
zation. However, this rule does not apply to cases where authorities, 
“approve the consolidation18 of small plots of land in order to improve 
land management and productivity” (article 20). The Rwandan gov-
ernment thus aims for the consolidation of small parts of land into 
larger plots, and for the consolidation of land into the hands of fewer, 
more efficient farmers. The land law, for example, sets no upper limits 
on the maximum size of landholdings. A ceiling of 50 hectares fore-
seen in an earlier version of the new land law did not appear in the final 
approved version. The objective behind this choice appears clear: cre-
ate economies-of-scale. Larger plots would become suitable for more 
modern intensive techniques. Larger farms could be managed more 
productively and become professional partners with agribusiness con-
cerns. (In section 3, we will question these assumptions.) 
Will the prohibition to divide plots of less than one hec-
tare have serious consequences for the majority of Rwandan peas-
ants? The average total land surface occupied by rural households is 
well below one hectare (in 2000, an average of 2.44 plots). By 2002, 
land holdings had become even more fragmented (calculations based 
on Food Security Research Project agricultural dataset, 2000-2002). 
By the letter of the law, small-scale landholders in times of setbacks 
would only be allowed to sell their integral plot so as to avoid further 
land fragmentation. Further, their chances of buying back land would 
be diminished, as they would either have to buy an adjacent plot or a 
plot of one hectare in total. 
The new land law includes another ‘guarantee’ for sound 
land management by giving the authorities the right to “impose sanc-
tions … against the landlord or any other person allowed to lease the 
land who fails to respect the obligation of efficiently conserving the 
land and productively exploiting it” (article 73). Productive land use, 
appropriate protection and sustainable productivity mean, “to pro-
tect it (i.e the land) from erosion, safeguard its fertility and ensure its 
production in a sustainable way” (article 62), and “shall be based on 
the area’s master plan and the general structure on land allocation, 
organization and use and [the adoption of] specific plants certified by 
relevant authorities” (article 63). 
The goal would be for each region to specialize in certain 
specific crops based on agro-bio-climatic conditions and in accordance 
with market needs. The local authorities, in the name of the local peas-
ants, will determine which crop(s) the region has a comparative advan-
18 Land consolidation is defined by the land law as, 
“a procedure of putting together small plots of land 
in order to manage the land and use it in an ef-
ficient uniform manner so that the land may give 
more productivity.” (Organic Law N° 08/2005 of 
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tage in. In  SPAT, a pilot exercise with a few districts resulted in the 
identification of three agricultural products per district. The document 
mentions the need to guide producers in their choice towards commer-
cial production systems and away from subsistence agriculture (GoR, 
2004A). This seems to be a first indication that the participation of 
peasants in the choice of those crops would be limited.
The strategy of specialization could however indeed result 
in economies of scale in terms of production and could increase the 
commercial bargaining position of local farmers on regional markets. 
On the other hand, the strategy should regard possible variations in 
soil types and climatic conditions within a local setting(s). Forcefully 
restricting farmers to a few crops at an aggregate scale might thus 
make little sense. An additional concern is whether small-scale, non-
commercial peasants will be able to confine themselves (even partly) 
to the prescribed crops, as they usually opt for a diversification in crop 
types based on risk-averse considerations. If the new policy does not 
offer them any additional risk-insurance, they will not be inclined to go 
for crop specialization. Another important question is whether small-
scale peasants will be able to defend their interests on the regional 
markets, or whether power positions in the bargaining process over 
food prices will be occupied by intermediary traders. 
In  some  regions,  peasants  are  already  obliged  by  the 
authorities to abandon and even destroy certain food crops. For ex-
ample, in early January 2007 the Governor of the Eastern Province, 
Mr. Mutsindashyaka, initiated a ban on sweet potatoes. Though the 
Minister of State for Agriculture later withdrew this declaration (New 
Times, 2007), such campaigns can and generally do cause a lot of un-
certainty and fear among local peasants.  
When land is not effectively conserved and productively 
used, or in more specific terms when it is degraded or has not been 
used  for  3  consecutive  years,  the  land  law  provides  for  sanctions. 
These typically take the form of requisitioning the land for a period of 
3 years (article 74). Local authorities are delegated extensive powers 
over managing, requisitioning and even reallocating land, “The req-
uisitioned land may be entrusted to another person who so requests 
and who demonstrates ability to efficiently conserve the land and pro-
ductively exploit it” (article 74). This legislation gives local authorities 
considerable freedom in interpreting specific situations according to 
their own agenda(s). Further, in cases of dispossession, the owner can 
only request for repossession in writing, explaining how he or she will 
commit him/herself to the productive exploitation of the plot in ques-
tion. When rejected, the only further option is to appeal to court. The 
formality of these procedures typically leaves little room for illiterate 
peasants with limited means to pursue their cases.IOB Discussion Paper 2007-02 • 2 Striving for Growth, Bypassing the Poor?
	 3.	 trAnsformIng	the	rurAl	seCtor:	the	poor	At		
	 	 	 the	forefront	or	remAInIng	offstAge?
The preceding analysis suggests that current ‘agricultural 
transformation policies’ tend to enhance the opportunities of high-po-
tential larger farmers at the expense of smaller-scale peasants. The 
principal issue is whether small-scale peasants are indeed less pro-
ductive in output terms when compared to larger farmers. In fact, this 
is not the case in the current Rwandan context when considering pro-
ductivity in terms of output per land unit. This is even recognised by 
SPAT which states, “small production units perform better per land 
unit  than  larger  ones”  (GoR,  2004B:10).  The  following  table  illus-
trates that the land-poorest quintiles are the most productive, both in 
terms of kilocalories produced per hectare, as well as in terms of added 
value (frw) of production per hectare. This can partly be explained by 
the fact that smaller farmers tend to have soils of better quality than 
larger farmers. But even when this factor is considered, the land-poor 
quintiles are still more efficient per land unit19. 













1 0.17 379,437 351,007 4,635 4,408
2 0.35 257,534 252,430 3,839 3,689
3 0.56 173,071 178,455 3,106 3,281
4 0.90 145,035 157,610 2,842 3,078
5 1.66 86,877 91,614 1,692 1,720
Total 0.56 173,071 175,641 3,098 3,210
* Accounting for differences in soil quality: land surface is multiplied by a soil quality index (above one 
for households with higher than average soil quality, and below one for households with lower than 
average soil quality).
Sources: Calculations for median added value of production per hectare are based on the combined 
EICV – FSRP dataset (2001). Calculations for median caloric value of production per hectare are 
based on FSRP (2001) and FAO (2007) datasets.
However,  Rwandan  policy  makers  count  on  the  high 
growth potential of larger farms to significantly upgrade their produc-
tivity, which should have a strong positive effect on aggregate output 
growth. Conversely, we found that before the implementation of these 
policies the participation effect of agricultural growth in poverty re-
duction has been disappointingly low for the post-war period. The 
main question is thus how rural policy, by focussing upon these high-
potential larger farmers, will affect the well-being of the majority of 
19 Small-scale  farmers  are  more  productive  in 
terms of output per land unit, but not in terms of 
output per unit of labour. The Rwandan country-
side is characterised by high underemployment, 
certainly  in  small-scale  farms.  For  those  house-
holds, the marginal increase in output when add-
ing additional labour is extremely limited due to a 
lack of land.
20 It is important to mention that the largest farm 
included in this analysis occupies only 9 hectares, 
which is still far less than the large-scale cattle 
farms that can, for example, be found in Umutara. 
The sample on which these data are based only 
includes rural households. Large-scale farms are 
however often owned by urban-based agricultur-
al investors. This explains why they do not appear 
in the sample.
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non-competitive, non-professional, subsistence-oriented rural agents. 
The rural sector is predominantly populated by “small family farms 
(over 90% of all production units) … with an average of less than one 
hectare in size, integrating polyculture – animal production systems” 
(GoR, 2004B:10). Most of these families depend, to a large extent, 
upon subsistence production and are found among the 66% group of 
‘rural poor’. The nationwide Participatory Poverty Assessment (PPA) 
exercise (2001-2003) provides further details on the different catego-
ries of peasants in Rwanda (Table 7).
Table 7: Population groups defined by PPA methodology
Category Characteristics
1. Umutindi	nyakujya Destitute, beg for their livelihood, no land, no animals, 
live from working on other peoples’ lands, but not very 
capable in terms of labour, ignorant, not respected, 
discriminated, look like “ fools”21.
2. Umutindi Very poor, live from working on other peoples’ lands, 
very little land with low harvests, no animals, no 
access to health care or schooling.
3. Umukene22 Poor, land to produce food for their family but no 
surplus for the market, often work for others, have no 
savings.
4. Umukene	wifashiye Poor with a bit more land, few animals, besides 
subsistence production they have a small income to 
satisfy a few other needs, (e.g. school fees for children).
5. Umukungu Rich in terms of food security, large farms (often with 
banana or coffee groves and/or forest), rich soils, some 
animals, enough food, employ others on own farms, at 
times get access to paid employment (higher-skilled 
jobs), have savings.
6. Umukire Rich in terms of revenue, land, animals, monetary 
revenue (coming from paid employment as civil 
servants or in trades), savings at official banks, their 
prosperity often pushes them to migrate to urban 
centres.
Source: Reformulated from GoR, 2004B:12-13; and GoR, 2001.
There are no aggregated country-level data on the propor-
tion of each farmer type in the total household population. However, 
SPAT mentions that about 11.5% of all households are landless (GoR, 
2004B:10), and thus would normally fall in the “umutindi” category. 
During own field research in six imidugudu23 in the Southern prov-
ince24  (May-July 2007), we counted the frequency of each category. 
In five out of six, the majority of the households were classified in the 
“umukene” categories25. The “umukungu” and “umukire” categories 
together accounted for a very small part of the total population. 
Our main goal is now to analyse how agricultural growth 
has/will affect the well-being of these different categories of peas-
ants. When growth results from increased efficiency and productiv-
21 The  tone  of  this  description  is  based  on  the 
Summary  Document  (GoR,  2004B),  not  on  the 
author’s  own  opinion.  The  description  of  this 
category as described in the document, was re-
produced by interviewees during field work under-
taken by the author in 2006. However, in one of 
the cellules the author visited, the interviewees 
stressed on the fact that in their village there are 
no “umutindi”. Due to the negative connotation of 
this word, they invented a category of ‘umukene 
nyakujya’ (very poor).
22 Umukene is the kinyarwanda word for “poor”, 
the plural is “abakene”.
23 Rwandan  households  are  typically  scattered 
over  the  hills.  The  umudugudu  (plural:  imidu-
gudu)  is  the  administrative  division  that  corres-
ponds with one or a few hills. The boundaries of 
the umudugudu after the administrative reform 
often  concur  with  the  boundaries  of  what  was 
called the cellule before the administrative reform 
(2006), at least in the rural setting. 
24 Before the recent administrative reform (2006), 
Rwanda  was  divided  into  11  provinces.  After 
the reform, there are 4 provinces. The previous 
provinces Gitarama and Gikongoro, where the re-
search was undertaken, now fall largely within the 
boundaries of the Southern Province.
25 In the poorest of the six imidugudu, the majority 
of the households were classified in the umutindi 
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ity - central objectives in Rwandan rural policies - then its impact 
on household incomes is twofold. On the one hand, there is a direct 
effect on agricultural output (i.e. a first-order effect) combined with 
induced changes in prices, wages and employment (i.e. second-order 
effects - Christiaensen and Demery, 2006). Although these second-
order effects receive little attention in the literature, they may be very 
important in helping to measure the pro-poor effects of agricultural 
growth, as shown by Minten and Barrett (2006). On the other hand, 
growth in the agricultural sector might also induce growth in rural non-
farm sectors by increasing demand for non-agricultural products and 
services, and by facilitating the supply of such products and services 
due to lower nominal wages (i.e. an indirect effect, see Christiaensen 
and Demery, 2006; Delgado et al., 1998 and Byerlee, 2005). A second 
type of indirect effects, ommited in the literature, is the impact of rural 
policies on the bargaining position of different farmer types. Changes 
in power relations may have a strong effect on their on-farm activities, 
off-farm employment, and overall well-being. Each of these effects re-
quires further examination.
The direct first-order effect of increased crop productivity 
positively affects those farmers with landholdings. However, as high-
lighted in several studies, the impact of this effect depends upon the 
initial distribution of land (Ravallion and Datt, 2002; Deininger and 
Squire, 1998 and de Janvry and Sadoulet, 1996), and upon the par-
ticipation of the poorer farmer categories in productivity gains (World 
Bank, 2005). Given Rwanda’s policy focus on larger farmers, with their 
greater  (presumed)  potential  for  professionalisation,  productivity 
gains will not be equally distributed over all farmer groups.
Increased agricultural output will further result in down-
ward pressure on food prices. The impact of lower food prices on a 
farmer’s welfare depends upon whether the farmer is a net food seller 
or a net food buyer and is dependent upon the price elasticity of de-
mand. However, little is known about the price elasticity of food in the 
Rwandan context. Inflation or deflation of food prices mostly affects 
those households that are active on the monetary food market.  The 
majority of small-scale peasants is not, however, among that group. 
For them, food price changes may have an indirect effect upon ex-
changes in the non-monetised barter economy, a sector that is, until 
now, poorly understood (GoR, 2002). 
Declines in food prices, in turn, allow nominal wage rates 
for unskilled labourers to fall. As a result, the demand for such labour 
may increase; certainly when agricultural growth is reinvested into 
the expansion of agricultural activities. For Rwanda, Mellor (2002A) 
estimates that a projected 5.3% agricultural growth in output would 26 • IOB Discussion Paper 2007-02 Striving for Growth, Bypassing the Poor?
result in a direct 3.2% increase in on-farm employment. On the other 
hand, the supply of unskilled labour is already extremely high in rural 
areas, and will only increase when a growing number of peasants be-
comes (near)-landless. Further, employment in the agricultural sector 
is mostly limited to daily wage labour (typically paid in cash, though 
sometimes only with food). Only extremely poor households gener-
ally undertake these informal food-for-work jobs. The availability of 
informal money-for-work jobs is highly volatile and uncertain. People 
in less-skilled agricultural jobs most often do this work on a tempo-
rary basis for low wages. Moreover, “having to work on someone else’s 
field” strongly diminishes a person’s perceived social status in Rwan-
da. Agricultural jobs are linked with “being poor” and one’s inability 
to “take care of oneself” (GoR, 2001). Table 8 illustrates this: the per-
centage of extreme poor (22.4%) involved in these jobs is higher than 
the percentage of non-poor (10.1%). Table 9 illustrates that the hourly 
wage rate of informal, less-skilled agricultural jobs is much lower than 
informal jobs in the non-farm sector. 
Table 8: Percentage of rural households involved in different




Revenue	from	agr.	sales 57.1 69.8 76.4 67.1
Revenue	from	livestock 18.8 23.1 32.5 25.0
Revenue	from	non-farm	enterprise 7.0 11.6 12.4 10.2
Revenue	from	skilled	jobs 0.6 2.3 7.6 3.6
Revenue	from	less-	skilled	non-agr.	jobs 6.0 8.3 9.8 7.9
Revenue	from	less-	skilled	agr.	jobs 22.4 14.6 10.1 16.1
			Of	which	permanent	employment 5.2 4.1 4.3 4.7
			Of	which	temporary	employment 18.1 10.9 6.0 12.0
Remarks: The extreme poor are defined as those living with less than 175 frw (US$ 0.28) per adult 
equivalent per day; the poor as those living with 175 – 250 frw (0.28 US$ 0.28 – 0.40) per adult equiva-
lent per day, the non-poor as those living with more than 250 frw (US$ 0.40) per adult equivalent per 
day. Amounts in frw are based on 2006 prices, and would correspond with 123 frw (instead of 175 frw) 
and 175 frw (instead of 250 frw) in 2001 prices.
Source: McKay income estimates based on EICV dataset (2001).IOB Discussion Paper 2007-02 • 27 Striving for Growth, Bypassing the Poor?








Source: Calculations based on EICV dataset (2001).
Taken together, the main question relevant to the Rwan-
dan peasant is whether the direct impact of the second-order effects 
(i.e. price and wage changes) in combination with the first-order effect 
(i.e. increased output) is positive or negative (Christiaensen and De-
mery, 2006). To determine this requires first to differentiate between 
various types of farmers. We adapt the typology of Christiaensen and 
Demery (2006) to the Rwandan context (Table 10) and combine it 
with the PPA categories.
 Table 10: The direct impact of increased productivity in the agricultural 
sector (as outlined in current rural policy) on different types of farmers 
in Rwanda






Land	owners	(S) Land	owners	(S) Land	owners	(M) Land	owners	(L)
1st  order effect 
(output increase)






2nd order effect 
(price changes)

















2nd order effect 
(wage change)
- - - + +
Likely	overall	
direct	impact
+	/	- - - + +
Symbols: (S) = small-scale, (M) = medium-scale, (L) = large-scale.
Source: Reinterpretation from Christiaensen and Demery, 2006.2 • IOB Discussion Paper 2007-02 Striving for Growth, Bypassing the Poor?
For the Umutindi categories, the picture is somewhat com-
plex. Given their landless status, they are unaffected by the first-order 
effects of increasing productivity. Whether they gain or lose depends 
upon whether the positive effect of decreased food expenditures is 
greater or smaller than their loss in wage income26. The overall direct 
effect of agricultural growth on this category is therefore unclear.
For both Umukene categories, the first-order effects of 
increased productivity could be positive if these peasants would di-
rectly participate in agricultural growth. However, it is unlikely that 
these groups will play an important role in commercialised and pro-
fessionalised agriculture. The potential for the rapid spread of new 
agricultural techniques (e.g. fertiliser use) to smaller peasants is ex-
tremely limited. The financial capacity of the ‘abakene’ (i.e. the plural 
of umukene) to invest in such technologies is also limited due to other 
expenditures that are considered more urgent (e.g. education of chil-
dren). Rural credit and insurance systems could compensate for such a 
lack of financial capital, but they are not open to poorer groups (Mel-
lor, 2002). The second-order effects of price and wage changes, on the 
other hand, negatively affect the well-being of these households. In 
instances of occasional production surpluses, the abakene will have 
more problems to compete with the lower-priced food of more profes-
sional farmers. As a result, market access for this category will dete-
riorate, which will further push these peasants into a “subsistence-
agriculture trap”, and limit their potential to diversify towards more 
commercially-oriented crops.
Finally, the Umukungu and Umukire categories of farm-
ers have the highest chance of profiting from both the land and agri-
cultural policies. In most cases, these households have the means to 
increase their landholdings and invest in new production techniques. 
Moreover, they are less bound by risk-averse considerations than the 
other categories. This gives them the opportunity to follow the new 
commercial orientations promoted by the government. As a result, 
their output should increase, thus protecting their share on a more 
competitive food market with reduced prices. As potential employers, 
they will likely face lower wage costs, which should allow them to fur-
ther expand their agricultural activities by hiring additional labour. 
Overall, the direct impact of the new rural policies seems 
rather  positive  for  more  prosperous  farmers,  while  discriminating 
against the poorer categories. However, there is also an indirect im-
pact of agricultural growth on the well-being of different categories. 
Christiaensen and Demery (2006) divide this trickle-down effect into 
three sub-groups: the inter-sectoral linkages (i.e. forward linkages to 
agro-processing and backward linkages to supply sectors); the final 
26 Over the last few years, food prices have highly 
increased. Wages for unskilled agricultural labour 
have also gone up, but relatively much less than 
food  prices.  One  might  expect  that  when  food 
prices  decrease  (due  to  increased  productivity), 
a similar relationship would hold; meaning that 
the wage rate would decrease but proportionally 
less than food prices. This evolution would turn 
out positively for the umutindi category. However, 
in field research interviews (May-July 2007), the 
umutindi categories in several of the six imidug-
udu mentioned the lack of bargaining power as 
one of the main reasons why their wages had not 
increased with approximately the same percent-
age as food price inflation. Therefore, it is highly 
unsure whether a decrease in food prices would 
turn out positively for this category, given that the 
supply of labour will further increase as more peo-
ple get of land (see later). This would negatively 
affect the already limited bargaining power of the 
umutindi category in wage negotiations.IOB Discussion Paper 2007-02 • 2 Striving for Growth, Bypassing the Poor?
demand effects (i.e. increased agricultural incomes lead to increased 
demand for local non-farm products); and the wage effects (i.e. wage 
decreases in non-agricultural sectors).
Mellor (2002) focuses on one of these indirect effects, 
highlighting the derived impact of agricultural growth on the non-ag-
ricultural sector. He argues that a major increase in production, and 
thus in the incomes of more prosperous farmers, should have a consid-
erable and favourable indirect impact upon employment and poverty 
reduction for small-scale farmers, through increased demand in the 
non-farm sectors. He quantifies this indirect impact; estimating that 
projected agricultural growth of 5.3% would produce (substantial) 
employment growth of 6.0% in the labour-intensive, rural non-farm 
sector (Mellor, 2002A). 
In the current economic environment, however, jobs are 
much scarcer than what Mellor estimates27. Nonetheless, Mellor ex-
pects this off-farm sector to boom as a derived effect of increased 
agricultural  growth.  He  states,  “Although  increased  incomes  may 
commence in the hands of the already more prosperous, that does 
not decrease the efficacy of the employment impact. That is because 
even those with large holdings by Rwandan standards are still small 
farmers who are fully integrated into their rural communities” (Mel-
lor,  2002A:17).  He  stresses  that  for  agricultural  growth  to  deliver 
increased employment and poverty reduction, a crucial assumption 
must be met: growth should be realised mainly by farmers28 who rein-
vest their profits in the local non-farm market; which in turn increases 
the overall demand for labour and the wage rates of the so-called ‘la-
bouring class’. However, the increased well-being of more prosperous 
farmers may reduce their embeddedness in the local rural community. 
One of the characteristics of the Umukire category, mentioned in the 
Participatory Poverty Assessment and by many respondents in field 
research (May-July 2007), is that households in this category tend to 
migrate to urban centres. It is thus unclear whether these richer farm-
ers will spend their additional incomes on rural goods and services, or, 
instead, on ‘urban status symbols’. 
Overall, it is thus doubtful whether agricultural growth 
will rapidly flow down to poorer farmers. Moreover, there will be other 
indirect effects, such as changes to bargaining positions between dif-
ferent groups of farmers. When larger farms receive the main benefits 
from agricultural growth and are transformed into highly-productive 
units, they will tend to drive less commercial and market-oriented 
farmers out of the market. Thus, as already mentioned, abakene cat-
egories might become trapped in self-subsistence farming; unable to 
surmount barriers towards commercially-oriented farming. Moreover, 
27 In  Mellor  2002B,  46%  of  the  labour  force 
(equal to 41.4% of the rural labour force) is as-
sumed to be employed in the rural non-tradable 
sector. In Mellor, 2002C, 15% of the labour force 
is  assumed  to  be  unemployed,  resulting  in  an 
employment rate of 31% of the labour force in the 
rural non-tradable sector (equal to 27.9% of the 
rural labour force). These figures are very different 
from the data in Table 8 indicating that 7.9 % of all 
households are involved in less-skilled non-agri-
cultural jobs and 10.2% generate revenues from 
non-farm enterprises. 
28 “Prospering  farmers  in  low-income  countries 
spend about 20 percent of incremental income on 
labor-intensive, livestock and horticultural prod-
ucts and 40 percent on rural non-farm goods and 
services. Rich landowners, on the other hand, typ-
ically spend incremental income on imports and 
capital-intensive manufactures. It is the peasant 
farmers’ purchases of locally-produced, labor-in-
tensive items that generate employment.” (Mellor, 
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in a nation of extreme land scarcity, richer high-potential farmers, with 
their financial power, will be able to block the necessary expansion of 
small-scale subsistence-oriented farms and, in the long-run, may ren-
der them unprofitable. 
The danger exists that current rural policies will increas-
ingly  enfeeble  small-scale  peasants.  Many  may,  at  some  time,  be 
forced into distressed land sales and, without realistic prospects for 
re-purchase, will lose their self-subsistence productive capacities and 
livelihoods. As a result, the number of employment seekers would grow, 
thus even further depressing wage rates. Overall, these processes will 
result in a ‘survival of the fittest’; or more accurately a ‘survival of the 
largest’ within the agricultural sector, with alternative employment 
unsure for those disregarded by these new rural policies . 
	 4.	 ConClusIon:	output	growth	versus	equIty			
	 	 	 ConsIderAtIons	-	An	unAvoIdAble	trAde-off?
The concluding action plan of the SPAT identifies, “the 
conciliation of the commercial orientation with the development ori-
entation”  as  a  major  challenge  for  agricultural  policy  making.  But 
based on the observations made in this paper, we conclude that the 
pro-poor ambition of the current agricultural policy remains largely 
rhetoric. It lacks strategic plans and budgetary commitments to coun-
ter those undesirable processes that weaken or threaten peoples’ live-
lihoods and lives. The recently adopted land policy and law show a 
similar discrepancy between pro-poor rhetoric on one hand and actual 
commitments in favour of competitive and commercial farmers on the 
other. Rwanda’s rural policies focus on maximum output and growth, 
without regard for equitable wealth distribution. This paper has illus-
trated how so-called pro-poor policies can introduce or reinforce in-
stitutional barriers for many, while facilitating access and enhancing 
opportunities for the few. This might render vulnerable those who are 
not so yet ; it might also force existing vulnerable groups into a poverty 
trap; and finally it might even increase conflict-risk by enlarging the 
mass of rural poor with few if any employment chances outside the 
agricultural sector.
This brings us to our first concluding question: is there, 
indeed, an unavoidable trade-off between output growth and equity 
considerations,  or  are  there  alternatives  that  combine  both?  Rural 
policies might have aimed for empowering and actively involving the 
large community of small-scale peasants in agricultural development 
strategies. Many have a high productive capacity but are confronted 
with institutional constraints in diversifying their activities away from IOB Discussion Paper 2007-02 • 1 Striving for Growth, Bypassing the Poor?
subsistence production. This would, however, require a complete re-
versal of the current rural policy logic. A crucial step then lies in defin-
ing institutional barriers for divergent farmer groups; and in analyzing 
how specific policies could remove those barriers. It would, perhaps, 
result in more modest growth projections for the agricultural sector, 
and should still, indeed, be combined with ‘charity measures’ for mar-
ginalised groups without much productive potential (e.g. due to lack of 
physical capacity). But it would certainly result in a more equitable dis-
tribution of agricultural growth and could pro-actively prevent house-
holds from falling into the vulnerability trap. By removing institutional 
barriers for many instead of for the few, rural policy would acknowl-
edge the ability of the large number of rural peasants to seize the op-
portunities at their disposal.
A second intriguing question is why current Rwandan pol-
icy makers do not take this alternative into consideration. Answering 
this question requires insight into the political economy of the current 
Rwandan society. There are two main features that characterise the 
current power holders, a largely urban-based elite. First, policy mak-
ers are strongly convinced of the “trickle-down” potential of rapid ag-
ricultural growth. This vision coincides with the ambitions of Rwanda’s 
elite to develop a “new” economy and transform their country. Other 
illustrations of this can be found in the first PRSP. There, for example, 
information technology development is identified as an important ac-
tivity to help move (or “jump”) Rwanda’s subsistence-based economy 
to a “service-sector driven, high-value added information- and knowl-
edge-based economy that can compete on the global market” (GoR, 
2002: 69). Current Rwandan policy makers adhere to the idea of social 
engineering through law, as conceived by Roscou Pound (1968) . They 
see policy and law as tools for shaping society, but often neglect the 
local conditions and institutional environment into which new laws 
and policies are to be implemented. This contextual background pre-
conditions the potential effectiveness of all new policies in achieving 
their goals.
Another feature of the current Rwandan elite is their lim-
ited connection with rural life. Pre-1994 elites had strong roots in rural 
Rwanda, though this often resulted in preferential treatment for cer-
tain regions over others, depending upon the power holders’ origins. 
On the other hand, it brought them closer to rural life and the prob-
lems Rwandan peasants were confronted with. Unlike their predeces-
sors, current elites have very few ties with Rwandan rural life. Many 
come from neighbouring countries where they lived either in urban 
areas or in dissimilar rural environments (e.g. as cattle farmers). As a 
result, ties between the Kigali-based “elites” and ordinary Rwandan 
subsistence peasants are weak.    2 • IOB Discussion Paper 2007-02 Striving for Growth, Bypassing the Poor?
This has two major consequences. First, it has lead to the 
paternalistic view of Rwanda’s urban elite regarding peasants’ abil-
ity to realize modern agricultural opportunities. Even official policy 
documents refer to the ignorance of peasants and their resistance to 
embrace new productivity-enhancing measures that go beyond their 
traditional subsistence farming logic. In its most blatant form, this 
conviction reduces the problem of rural poverty to one of bad mental-
ity. The second result is that urban elites have little personal interest 
in improving living conditions for the rural masses. Whereas the pre-
1994 elite largely depended upon a rural power base to maintain their 
position, the current elite depends almost exclusively upon an urban 
peer group and the international donor community for support.
The stated ambition of EDPRS policy is to “refocus on 
equitable growth, sustainable development, and poverty reduction”, 
with rural development as an important priority29. Striving for pro-
poor growth, however, cannot be restricted to “looking for growth in 
the sector where the poor are located”. The major challenge for policy 
makers and international donors is to shift their attention away from 
a purely output-led logic of agricultural transformation towards more 
integrating, distribution-oriented rural development policies. In other 
words, the challenge is to reconcile efficiency in creating economic 
growth with equity, and perhaps, to put equity first. 
29 Various  documents  explaining  the  logic  and 
planning of the EDPRS process can be found on 
www.devpartners.gov.rw/edprs.php.IOB Discussion Paper 2007-02 •  Striving for Growth, Bypassing the Poor?
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